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JURISDICTION AND NATURE Or PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The iltdhi .Supreme Court has jurisdiction nf M I M n^peni 
pursuant to Utah CodP AIIII ^78- <?-? ( 3 j and Utah Constitution article 
i l l i , H ! in mi i i i in in I ii in in1, n i l i n i l in 11 in in n i l t i i y n a p p e a l s f r o m f h n 
Third Judicial m-'.lrict Court in anu for Sali Lake County, wherein 
judgp David Ynunq granted summary judgment, i in favor m MUM 
r
°sDonae: 11u i'i i in , 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
] C :::>es Utah Code Ann. §78-1 2-2:5.5 bar al 1 claims, Including 
claims foi mdemni t icdt 11 HI niiJii! l • 11 • 11«-' t i I i • • • I I n c r m III I in i 
arising out of the construction of the Little America Hotel, ii ui 
in t in HI I in 1 i i ininipneed nn thin claim until more than seven years 
has passed since the. construction i J-JO oinplmte 
: i Should the Court refuse to overturn its previous ruling 
I" I j iif s/H I '• I " 'i net" i tut ional in xxym-
 w ; w;c doctrine of 
stare decisis? 
in I J'- ' ulitii. tli J legislature enacted §78-12-25 S , did the 
c ' I in i'i " nn i ' ii i»j-.n til- action against i contractor 
brought by an Injured third-party, when Miu < n | u i n •• ^IJM .*H-I 
after completion ot the construction project? 
4 " , I ' i1 i I • l.i\ifji i M ' l i»!"»:j' In-led! from raisinq i "due 
process" constitutional challenge to Ot dh iivde Ann, k ,'H • I,.- ' lliiir 
t h e fi r st time on appeal? 
1 
5. Is paragraph 4.18.1 of the contract between Okland and 
Little America violative of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §13-
8-1 under the circumstances and thus void and unenforceable? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. 
[N]o State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person in its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Utah Const, art. I § 2. 
All political power is inherent in the people 
and all free governments are founded on their 
authority for their equal protection and 
benefit, and they have the right to alter or 
reform their government as the public welfare 
may require. 
Utah Const, art. 1 § 11. 
All courts shall be open, and every person for 
any injury done to him in his person, property 
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course 
of law, which shall be administered without 
denial or unnecessary delay; and no person 
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any trial in this State, by himself or 
counsel, in any civil cause to which he is a 
party. 
2 
Section 78-12-25.5 Utah Code Ann. (i^oJ, as amended) 
Injury due to defective design or construction of improvement 
to real property - within seven years 
An action to recover damages for any 
i njury to property, real or personal 
or for any injury to the person, or 
for bodily injury or wrongful death, 
arising out of the defective and 
unsafe condition of any improvement 
to real property, or any action for 
damages sustained on account of the 
injury, may not be brought against 
any person performing or furnishing 
the design, planning, surveying, 
supervising the construction of, or 
constructing the improvement to real 
property more than seven years after: 
the completion of construction. 
The ,. * .,.*. Lamon imposed by thi s 
section does not apply to any person in 
actual possession and control as owner, 
tenant or otherwise of the improvement at 
the time the defective and unsafe 
condition of the improvement constitutes 
the proximate cause of the injury for 
which an action is brought. 
This section does not extend or limit the 
period otherwise prescribed by state law 
for the bringing of any action, 
As; used in this section; 
(, i j Person meaiis ,.. individual 
corporation, partnership or other 
legal entity. 
(b) lfCompletion of construction" leans 
the date f: issuance • - the 
certificate of substantial completion 
by the owner, architect, engineer or 
other agent or the date of the owner's use 
of possession of the improvement on real 
property. 
Section 13-8-1 Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) 
Construction industry - Agreements to indemnify. 
A covenant, promise, agreement or understanding 
in, or in connection with or collateral to, a 
contract or agreement relative to the 
construction, alteration, repair or maintenance 
of a building, structure, highway, appurtenance 
and appliance, including moving, demolition and 
excavating connected therewith, purporting to 
indemnify the promisee against liability for 
damages arising out of bodily injury to persons 
or damage to property caused by or resulting 
from the sole negligence of the promisee, his 
agents or employees, or indemnitee, is against 
public policy and is void and unenforceable. 
This act will not be construed to affect or 
impair the obligations of contracts or 
agreements, which are in existence at the time 
the act becomes effective. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is a consolidation of two appeals from the Third 
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable 
David S. Young presiding. The first appeal was taken from Judge 
David Young1s ruling granting summary judgment in favor of 
defendants Martin Stern Jr. & Associates, Okland Construction Co., 
Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc. and Higham-Hilton Mechanical 
4 
I'I int M r t ors lin (hereinafter referred to is "Stern", "Okland" 
"Rocky Mountain" and "Higham-Hi Itun" , respect ivol, ! iinl K M in i 1 
plaintiff, i ones Sanchez, 
Jcnnent * "• *bc - ^kiir:: 
moved for summary judgmei. . , ^ 3 ^ .. 
brought against if bv defendant Little America Hotel, Ino. 
(hereinJ1 1 1.1 1 ef ei: J t»<J ii « " 1 1M 1»» f^ ipi M M " ) . Judge Young entered 
summary judgment, in Okland"s favor «n niisl crosscia J nib I j > L 
and appeal was also filed by Little America. 
Aftcii LjuLli appeal' hi in! inn ! 1 I 1 1II 11 1 each respective 
appellant had filed their briefs, all ul 1 hi parties mi .lppeal 
sf i pu 1 atpd thf\*" tV\> two appeals couJtl he consolidated and this 
Cou 11 entu 1 tid 111 11 r uu 1 e1 i. e*. 1 1 11" j t 111 1 1 m« • 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 4, 198<# „ James Sanchez \ 
head after diving into a swimming pot - * kittle A m e n t a .ioic. 
in , rill L11H-* ("ill , lit ili in t prior - «......- Sanchez 
had been in the. sauna at the 1 it I l 
dozing off in ilie1 sauna ami then waking up feeling dizzy and 
d in s u e ,1 e n I, f I II It,'. I'tl'H 1 Hi ii 1 L would be a good idea to try and 
5 
cool off, so he went to the pool, dived in and struck his head. 
Deposition of James Sanchez, dated 11/21/87 at 3 5 (hereinafter 
"Sanchez Depo.") 
Mr. Sanchez had been swimming in the same pool earlier in the 
day and had exited the pool at that time just a few feet from where 
he dived in at the time that he injured himself. He recalls that 
when he got out of the pool earlier in the day he noticed that the 
pool depth marks in the area indicated that the water was five feet 
deep. Sanchez Depo. at 45-48. 
Sanchez filed an action against Little America on January 14, 
1987 for the injuries he sustained. (R. 2 - 18) . On or about 
November 16, 1987, Sanchez filed an amended complaint, naming 
Okland, among others, as an additional party. (R. 51-82, 89-90). 
The construction of the Little America Hotel pool and sauna 
were substantially complete, and Little America took possession of 
the same by November 15, 1978, with more than seven years passing 
between the date of substantial completion and the time of the 
accident. (R. 224-225). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
As set forth in Argument I, this Court has already determined 
that Utah Code Ann., §78-12-25.5 is constitutional based upon a 
prior challenge that the statute violated the "open courts11 
provision of the Utah Constitution, as well as the equal protection 
p r o v i s i o n s of Lint li I hu HniU>i| M a t p h i ml i it ,th Const i t u t i nrn Thus 
t h e Court s h o u l d uphuld t h e luwer c o u r t "'s judgment based n| > i 
i M , r d e c i s i o n r * h i r i s s u e n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e d o c t r i n e ft 
s t a r e dec i i nil niju/t*i i i i i I n •, 11 iiiiiii 111111. rourf 1 ' " p r i o r 
d e c i s i o n s t h a t ^ 7 8 - 1 2 - 2 5 . 5 does n o t v i o l a t e t h e V ^ u m p r o t e c t i o n " 
iin| ii », P > iii" |"jar' :int'p»r of + he " n i t e d S t a t i c i in >i 
C o n s t i t u t i o n - F i n a l l y , M i l h« Aniei u i nut n u n ' s h . - i l lenie < 
t h e Utah Code Ann, W 8 - 1 2 - 2 5 . 5 i s not p r o p e r l y LafoLt f he ^ u t 
-
 M
 isinurn ' 1,1 i II :ed for nhe f i r s * t in*3 *»n a p p e a l . 
in Argument i i , uRiann i J r s i « i I i icmniibi i n i \ in n i III i de 
Ann, § 7 8 - 1 2 - 2 5 . 5 i s a c o m p l e t e bar tw a l l c l a i m s b iouqht i ) , . sf 
1
 j e i i e id i >" * jn I i I I I i f iji" o l c o n s t r u c t i o n which ha s been 
completed l o r more t h a n seven y e a r s , iin in i n n i n n . 
i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n , Second, c a s e law and s t a t u t e e s t a b l i s h tha" I he 
c o n t i i . lu i I ii IMHIJI i in i ii I in i nn|iM |p r p l i e d upon by L i f t l p America 
i s v o i d and uimnforceabJe pu r suan t If iJt.jtj LUIJI- HI , 
b e c a u s e *• m% r r t p i i r e Ok land t o indemni ty L i t t l e America under t he 
c i r c u m s t a i u e nl I it nil III MM IIIIIII ht-nnu r e q u i r e d t n indemni ty 
L i t t l e America tor; L i t t l e America" & >> iU n e g l i g e n t i i1 i i 
o f s a j _ ^ s tatute . 
ARGUMENT I 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-25.5 IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
SHOULD BE ENFORCED AS WRITTEN. 
A. The Court should not disturb it prior 
pronouncement that Utah Code Ann., §78-12-25.5 
is constitutional. 
In the case of Good v. Christensen. 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974), 
this Court was faced with the identical issue now faced by the 
Court, namely, does §78-12-25.5 violate (1) the "equal protection" 
guarantees of the United States and Utah Constitutions, and (2) the 
"open courts" provisions of the Utah Constitution. The Good Court 
expressly held that the attack on the constitutionality of the 
statute was "without merit". Id. at 225. Although the Court in 
Good did not thoroughly explain its holding, an examination of the 
brief submitted by the appellant in the Good case shows that the 
statute in that case was challenged on the identical grounds that 
have been raised in the present appeal. The statute was challenged 
in Good, as set forth in Appellant's Brief: 
This is a violation of the due process and equal 
protection provisions of the 14th Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States, as well as 
Sections 2, 7, and 11 of Article 1 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. 
Brief of Appellant, Case No. 13659 at 17-18, Briefs of the Supreme 
Court of Utah, Vol. 896. Copies of both the appellant's and the 
SL 
r e s p o n d e n t * s b r i e t s in UIH ^ruud i-atA-i appeal, «u < Addendum "A" ai id 
"B" of t h i s b r i e f r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
1 111 I tit? Good ' ou r t was f u 11 y d w n r H of t h e c o n s t I t u t iona 1 
a t t a c k r a i s e d on h .h |< I J '-i -jinl IJIIPIJU I < fn M I I y upheld t h e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h e s t a t u t e in i t s o p i n i o n . Inasmuch as t h i s 
m l Hi i1* .usf
 t\ i lie I tin* c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of Utah Code Ann, *i/8-
12 -2 5 . 5 under t he i d e n t i c a J cha 11 enq..- \A I u » L €< .,> j nu«11 • 111 '" 11 • • 
p r e s e n t appea l i he Court shou ld unpin hi II n e c i s i o n iii <juod 
,..n bUci. • Vt ' , , ,' i' ijtiiiie d e c i s i s , When r e f e r r i n g t o t h e 
d o c t r i n e of s t a r e d e c i s i s t h i s Court has reiiidnieu 
It is one of the important principles in the 
structure of our law, i n a well ordered society 
it is important that people know what their legal 
rights are, not only under constitutions and 
legislative enactments, but also as defined by 
judicial precedent, and having conducted their 
affairs in reliance thereon, ought not to have 
their rights swept away by judici al decree. 
Freeman v S t e w a r t s I- M i 74, Un iiitiin 1954) , Tn t h e Fteeman 
c a s e t h e Cour t was aske- « " ieu ' " , «if 'M»P « i ;»ve? il p a s t 
d e c i s i o n s r e g a r d i n q whether oi run improvement d i s t r i c t s w'eie 
HI i in in mi i i prill r n r p o r a t i o n s aic; cnntempi *tpH t * t u n e r The 
C o u r t s u c c i n c t l y .:it. atiud II HJ t o 
r e v i e w t o c o r r e c t n e s s of t h o s e p r i o r d e c i s i o n s , • u i e d o c t r i n e nf 
s t a r e decis is 1 . « . fays out* h a n d s . i d . a t 176 . 
In a more recent pronouncement, Justice Howe's concurring 
opinion in Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co,, 740 P.2d 1281 (Utah 
1987) , quoted with approval from several cases discussing the 
doctrine of stare decidis, including: "a statutory construction 
once made and followed should never be altered upon the changed 
views of new personnel." In re Burtt's Estate, 353 Pa. 217, 44 
A.2d 670, 162 A.L.R. 1053 (1945). 
It is important to note that the Court's decision in Good, 
which upheld the constitutionality of the contractor's statute of 
repose, pre-dated Okland's agreement to participate in the 
construction of the Little America project. Accordingly, under the 
principles and rationales supporting the doctrine of stare decisis, 
Okland was therefore entitled to assume that its potential 
liability on the project was totally extinguished once the project 
had been completed for a period of seven years. 
In it's appellant's brief, Little America cited to the Malan 
v. Lewis decision in support of the proposition that "a ruling that 
a statute is constitutional does not thereafter become immune from 
reconsideration". See, Appellant's Brief of Little America Hotel, 
Inc. at 36, (quoting, Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 668-669 (Utah 
1984)). However, Little America's brief fails to quote the entire 
sentence from the Malan decision. That sentence in its entirety 
states: 
10 
But a ruling that a statute is constitutional does 
not thereafter become immune from reconsideration 
when other laws have been enacted or new factual 
circumstances arise that alter the premises upon 
which the challenged statute was based. 
Id, at 668-669 (emphasis added)• 
In the past fifteen years since this Court declared that Utah 
Code Ann., §78-12-25.5 was constitutional in the Good decision, 
there have been no new laws enacted and no new factual 
circumstances have arose which should cause this Court to 
reconsider its previous decision. Therefore, the Good Court's 
decision with regard to the constitutionality Utah Code Ann.,§78-
12-25.5 should stand, and the appellants' appeals should be 
dismissed. 
B. Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 clearly 
does not violate either "open court" or 
"equal protection" provisions of the 
United States and Utah Constitutions. 
a. "Open Court" Analysis 
At the outset it should be noted that statutes are endowed 
with a strong presumption of validity and they should not be 
declared unconstitutional if there is any reasonable basis upon 
which they can be found to come within the constitutional 
framework. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983). 
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In the case of Berrv v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 760 (Utah 
1985), this Court established a two-part test for determining 
whether or not a statute violated Utah Constitution Art. I, §11. 
First, 
Section 11 is satisfied if the law provides an injured 
person an effective and reasonable alternative remedy 
"by due course of law" for vindication of his 
constitutional interest. 
and second, 
If there is no substitute or alternative remedy 
provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause of action 
may be justified only if there is a clear social or 
economic evil to be eliminated and the elimination of 
an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or 
unreasonable means for achieving the objective. 
Id. at 680. 
Mr. Sanchez does have an adequate alternative remedy and 
therefore the architect's and builder's statute of repose meets the 
first part of the Berry test. As was stated earlier in this brief, 
the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 was previously 
upheld in the Good decision. Good. 527 P. 2d at 225. In 
distinguishing the builder's statute of repose from the products 
liability statute of repose, the Berry Court noted that the Good 
Court had "observed that a person injured by a defect in a building 
would still have a remedy against an owner of the building and 
perhaps others." Berry, 717 P.2d at 683. 
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Section 78-12-25.5 specifically provides that: 
The limitation imposed by his provision shall not 
apply to any person in actual possession and control 
as owner, tenant or otherwise . . . at the time . . . 
of the injury . . . . 
Utah Code Ann., §78-12-25.5 (1967). The Good Court interpreted 
this language to mean that the statute "allows others to sue him 
[the owner] for his torts, if any, within the regular statute of 
limitation after the cause accrues." Good. 527 P.2d at 225. 
A landowner such as Little America has a duty towards its 
business invitees, such as Mr. Sanchez, to inspect and maintain its 
premises in a reasonably safe condition or to warn the visitor of 
any dangerous conditions existing thereon. Stevens v. Colorado 
Fuel & Iron, 469 P.2d 3 (Utah 1970); Roaalski v. Phillips Petroleum 
Company. 282 P.2d 304 (Utah 1955). Thus, Mr. Sanchez may proceed 
to seek recovery from Little America, if Little America breached 
a duty which it owed to him. Mr. Sanchez also contends that the 
manufacturer of the sauna manufactured a defective product. The 
builder's statute of repose would not bar recovery in a products 
liability action. 
Other Courts, when confronted with an "open courts" challenge 
to their state's builder's statute of repose have found that since 
alternative remedies exist the statute is constitutional. Reeves 
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v, Ille Electric Co, . 551 P.2d 647, 652 (Mont. 1976), Walsh v. 
Gowing, 494 A.2d 543, 548 (R.I. 1985). 
Because the first prong of the Berry two-part test is met, 
there is no need to proceed to the second prong. However, Utah 
Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 also meets the requirements of the second 
test. An examination of the reasons that other courts have given 
in upholding their builder's statutes of repose against "open 
court" provision challenges is helpful. 
The statute of repose is needed to eliminate perpetual 
liability on the part of builders and architects. Yarbro v. Hilton 
Hotels Corp.. 655 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1983); Klein v. Catalano. 437 
N.E. 2d 520 (Mass. 1982). 
Builders and Architects have no control over the building once 
the owner takes possession of it. Therefore, there is the 
possibility of neglect, poor maintenance, mishandling, improper 
modification and improper repair. See. Barnhouse v. Pinole, 183 
Cal. Rptr. 881 (Cal. 1982); Yarbro, 655 P.2d at 826; and Cheswold 
Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lambertson Construction, 489 A.2d 413 (Del. 
1984) . 
Requiring architects and builders to remain potentially liable 
as long as the structure remains standing puts an undue burden upon 
them in having to defend lawsuits which are brought many years 
after the structure was complete. 
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After such a long delay, as in this case, the proof 
problems in defending a negligence action of this 
kind would be very difficult to surmount. For example, 
the standards for architectural performance as well as 
building codes could have changed significantly in 
the intervening years, and it would be difficult to 
establish the standard of care of a reasonably 
prudent architect at the time the design services 
were rendered in the late 1950fs. See, Howell v. Burk, 
90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214 (1977). These problems, 
in our view, support the reasonableness of the 
legislative action. We are not unmindful of the fact 
that these delays also impose proof problems on the 
party asserting liability, but nevertheless the 
legislature is free to set reasonable restrictions so 
long as constitutional requirements are met. 
Yarbro, 655 P.2d at 826 fn. 5. It should be noted that the passage 
of time has made important facts in this case more difficult to 
ascertain. For instance, in attempting to discover the date when 
the Little America project was substantially completed it was 
learned that the pertinent records kept by Salt Lake City only go 
back as far as 1980. It was further learned that the gentleman who 
would have performed the bulk of the inspection on the Little 
America project on behalf of Salt Lake City was deceased. See, 
Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment p. 6, Record 
at 513. 
Congressional studies have shown that the vast majority of all 
claims brought against design and building professionals are 
brought within seven years after the construction is complete. 
Hearings on H.R. 6527, H.R. 6678, and H.R. 11544 Before 
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Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the District of 
Columbia. 90th Cong., 1st Session 28 (1967), cited in Yarbro. 655 
P.2d at 825 fn. 4. 
For the foregoing reasons Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 also 
meets the requirements of the second prong of the Berry test. The 
statute provides a reasonable means for obtaining the proper 
objective of prohibiting the potential of perpetual liability 
against architects and builders, and therefore is not violative of 
Utah Constitution Art. I §11. 
Finally, with respect to appellants' open court arguments, it 
should be noted that to potentially violate Utah Constitution Art. 
I §11# the subject law must seek to eliminate an "existing legal 
remedy". Berry, 717 P.2d at 680. Therefore, if in 1967, at the 
time that Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 was enacted, the courts of 
this State did not recognize a cause of action by a third-party 
against the builder of an alleged defective premises, then the 
statute did not eliminate an existing remedy and cannot be 
violative of the open court provisions of the Utah Constitution. 
At or about the time that the statute of repose was enacted, 
Utah courts adhered to the general rule that a contractor's 
liability on a project ended when the owner accepted the work. 
See, Leininaer v. Stearns Roger, 404 P.2d 33 (Utah 1965). The 
Leininaer Court discussed the "modern view" wherein some court's 
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were extending contractor's liability to cover injuries sustained 
by third-persons after the construction was complete. Id. at 36. 
However, the Leininaer Court did not say whether or not it was 
adopting the modern view in Utah, and specifically refused to say 
whether the contractor at issue in the case could be held liable 
to the injured third-party. Id. at 37. 
Recently the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of its architect's statute of repose against an 
"open court" challenge. Zapata v. Burns. 542 A.2d 700 (Conn. 
1988) . The Zapata court noted that a cause of action against an 
engineer or architect, by a person not in privity with them was a 
"relatively recent development in the law". Id. at 710. The court 
held that since the cause of action was not recognized at the time 
that the state constitution was adopted in 1818, that the statute 
did not violate the "open courts" clause of the constitution. Id. 
at 711. 
In Utah, not only would Mr. Sanchez not have been able to 
bring a successful cause of action against Okland for the relief 
that he seeks at the time that our state constitution was adopted, 
he would not even have been able to bring the action in 1967 when 
the statute of repose was enacted. This Court had not yet 
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recognized the cause of action. Therefore, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-
25.5 did not abrogate an "existing" cause of action at the time it 
was enacted and does not violate Utah Constitution Art. I §11. 
b. Equal Protection Analysis 
For purposes of equal protection analysis, because there is 
neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right involved, the 
court's scrutiny of the statute need only determine whether the 
statute bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state 
objective. State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984); Malan, 693 
P.2d at 674 fn. 17; Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels, 655 P.2d 822 (Colo. 
1982); and Twin Falls Clinic v. Hamill. 644 P.2d 341 (Idaho 1982). 
The appellants argue that the Utah contractor's statute of 
repose establishes an unreasonable classification because it does 
not include owners and materialmen. When confronted with an 
identical argument surrounding a challenge to its contractor's 
statute of repose the Supreme Court of Colorado reasoned that (1) 
owners were properly excluded from the statute because of their 
"continuing control of the premises and are responsible for repairs 
and replacements of damaged or dangerous conditions", and (2) 
materialmen were properly excluded from the statute because their 
accountability was covered under theories of products liability law 
and: 
18 
Suppliers and manufacturers, who typically supply 
and produce components in large quantities, make 
standard goods and develop standard processes. They 
can thus maintain high quality control standards in 
the controlled environment of the factory. 
Yarbro, 655 P.2d at 828. The Yarbro court therefore concluded that 
the classification was reasonable and that the classification was 
reasonably related to the legitimate state objective of limiting 
liability for architects, contractors, engineers and inspectors 
once their participation in a project is completed. Id. at 827. 
Just as in Yarbro, the reasonable classifications established 
by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 are reasonably related to a 
legitimate state objective. It was reasonable of the legislature 
to specifically exclude owners so as not to relieve them of their 
ongoing duties of care towards persons who enter onto their 
premises. Likewise, it was reasonable to exclude materialmen, 
whose liability in such cases would be governed under principles 
of products liability law. 
And, just as in Yarbro. Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 serves the 
legitimate state objective of eliminating perpetual liability ont 
he part of builders and architects. See, previous argument and 
discussion at p. 14 - 16 of this brief. In addition to the 
Colorado Supreme Court, a list of some of those courts who have 
upheld contractor's and architect's statutes of repose when faced 
with equal protection challenges includes: Twin Falls Clinic & 
19 
Hospital Blda. v. Hamill. 644 P.2d 341 (Idaho 1982); Yakima Fruit 
and Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating and Plumbing, 503 P.2d 108 
(Wash. 1973); Reeves v. Ilie Electric Company, 551 P.2d 647 (Mont. 
1976); Barnhouse v. Pinole, 183 Cal. Rptr. 881 (Cal. App. 1982); 
Zapata v. Burns. 542 A.2d 700 (Conn. 1988); Burnmaster v. Gravity 
Drainage Dist. No. 2. 366 So.2d 1381 (La. 1978); Whiting-Turner 
Contracting Co. v. Coupard. 499 A.2d 178 (Md. 1985); Cheswold Vol. 
Fire Co. v. Lambertson Construction, 489 A.2d 413 (Del. 1984); and 
Beecher v. White. 447 N.E.2d 622 (Ind. App. 1983). 
C. Little America's constitutional challenge 
based upon "due process" arguments is not properly 
before the Court, as it was not raised as an 
issue before the court below. 
In its appellant's brief, Little America argues that Utah Code 
Ann. §78-12-25.5 violates due process guarantees of the United 
States and Utah constitutions. See, Little America's Appellant's 
Brief p. 41. However, this is the first time in this action that 
a challenge has been raised to the statute based on due process 
considerations. This Court cannot consider matters not in the 
record before the trial court for the first time on appeal. Matter 
of Estate of Cluff, 587 P.2d 128 (Utah 1978); Reliable Furniture 
Company v. Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc.. 380 
P.2d 135 (Utah 1963). 
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A review of the record before the court below shows that due 
process arguments were not presented to Judge Young for his 
consideration in ruling upon the motions for summary judgment at 
issue here. Therefore, Little America's attempt to argue it for 
the first time on appeal is inappropriate. 
And, in any event, the constitutional challenges presented to 
the Court in the Good decision included due process arguments. 
See, Addendum "A" p. 17-18. Thus, this Court's holding in the Good 
case is also dispositive of due process claims. 
It should also be noted that the courts of other states have 
consistently upheld the constitutionality of similar statutes of 
repose against challenges that the statutes violated due process. 
Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp.. 655 P.2d at 826 (Colo. 1982); 
Reeves v. Ille Electric Company, 551 P.2d at 652 (Mont. 1976); 
Klein v. Catalano. 437 N.E.2d 514 (Mass. 1982); Cheswold Volunteer 
Fire Company v. Lambertson Construction Company. 489 A.2d 413 (Del. 
1984); Barnhouse v. City of Pinole, 183 Cal.Rptr. 881 (Cal.App. 
1982), Beecher v. White, 447 N.E.2d 622 (Ind.App. 1983), Elizabeth 
Gamble Deaconess Home v. Turner Construction, 470 N.E.2d 950, 957 
(Ohio App. 1984). 
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ARGUMENT II 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-25.5 AFFORDS OKLAND ULTIMATE 
REPOSE FROM ANY AND ALL ACTIONS ARISING OUT OF THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL. 
A. Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 is a bar to 
Little America's crossclaims for contractual 
and equitable indemnification against Okland. 
This Court has interpreted Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 to mean 
that "(i)t prevents the owner as well as all others from suing the 
designer, planner, supervisor or contractor after seven years from 
completion of the project." Good, 527 P.2d at 224. Inspite of 
this clear and direct language from the Court, Little America 
contends that it may still sue Okland on theories of indemnity. 
It is the general rule that "a cause of action for indemnity 
does not arise until the liability of the party seeking indemnity 
results in damage, either through payment.of a sum clearly owned 
or through the injured party's obtaining an enforceable judgment." 
Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co. . 681 P.2d 214, 218 (Utah 
1984). However, just two paragraphs further into the opinion, the 
Perry Court stated an exception to that general rule: 
A specific statutory limitation period that seeks 
ultimate repose of causes of action will control 
over a general statute of limitations, even to cut 
off an indemnity action that technically has not 
accrued. 
Id. at 218. 
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Causes of action for indemnity are cut off by a statute of 
repose such as §78-12-25.5 inasmuch as a required element for such 
an action is that "the prospective indemnitor [Okland] must also 
be liable to the third person [Sanchez]11. Perry, 681 P.2d at 218. 
Because the statute of repose cuts off Okland1s liability to 
Sanchez, this necessary element of an indemnity action is missing. 
Court's of other jurisdictions have held that statutes of 
repose cut off all actions for indemnification including those 
based on contract. To prevent "perpetual liability" a builder's 
statute of repose was held to cut off claims for express and 
implied contractual indemnity, equitable indemnity and comparative 
indemnity, when the underlying action was brought beyond the 
statute's 10 year limit. Sandy v. Superior Court (Daon Corp.), 247 
Cal Rptr. 677 (Cal.App. 1988). This was held to be so even though 
the causes of action for indemnity had not yet accrued. Id. at 
683. See also. Aaus v. Future Chattanooga Development Corporation, 
358 F.Supp. 246 (D.C. Tenn. 1973); Nevada Lakeshore Co. v. Diamond 
Electric. Inc.. 511 P.2d 113 (Nev. 1973); Beecher v. White. 447 
N.E.2d 622 (Ind.App. 1983); and Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. 
Coupard. 499 A.2d 178 (Md. 1988). 
Little America's reliance upon the Valley Circle case, 
discussed at length in its appellant's brief p. 13-15, is misguided 
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in that a correct reading of the case shows that it stands for the 
very proposition that Okland now makes for the Court. 
We read this language to mean that a cross-
complaint for indemnity may be filed more than 
10 years after the alleged indemnitor has 
substantially completed his services, provided 
that the underlying action was itself brought 
within the 10-year limitation period of the 
statute. 
Valley Circle Estates v. VTN Consol, Inc., 659 P.2d 1160 (Cal. 
1983). There is no question that the action brought by Mr. Sanchez 
and the subsequent crossclaims by Little America were filed after 
the seven-year Utah limitation period. Therefore, the Valley 
Circle decision does not help Little America's position, in fact 
it is quite detrimental to Little America's position. 
Likewise, Little America's reliance on the Southeastern 
Electric Company case, which was discussed at length in its brief, 
is misguided. In that case the Court was comparing two statutes 
of limitation, one for three years and one for six years; the court 
was not confronted with a statute of repose and whether or not it 
would cut off claims for contractual indemnity. Insurance Company 
of North America v. Southeastern Electric Company, 275 N.W.2d 255 
(Mich. 1979). Also, Little America's discussion of the Wolverine 
case is not helpful, because again the Court was not confronted 
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with whether an indemnity action was barred by an applicable 
statute of repose. Wolverine Insurance Co. v. Tower Ironworks. 
Inc., 370 F.2d 700 (1st Cir. 1966). 
To argue, as Little America does, that indemnity actions are 
not cut off by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5, but that instead the 
six-year statute of limitation for contracts, Utah Code Ann. §78-
12-23 is applicable, is to ignore the plain and direct 
pronouncement of the Perry Court to the contrary* In the Perry 
case, which involved the sale of goods, the Court was confronted 
with the question as to whether or not the four-year statute of 
limitations provided in the Uniform Commercial Code, Utah Code Ann. 
§70A-2-725, was applicable as opposed to the six-year general 
contract statute of limitations Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23. In 
holding that the four-year statute of limitations was applicable, 
the Court stated that "(w)hen two statutory provisions appear to 
conflict, the more specific provision will govern over the more 
general provision." Perry, 681 P.2d at 216. 
In Perry the Court determined that the more "specific" statute 
was the one intended to provide "ultimate repose" in transactions 
for the sale of goods. Id. at 219. The Court also reasoned that 
the "ultimate repose" intended by the statute barred all actions 
brought more than four years after delivery of the goods, including 
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actions for indemnity, inspite of the fact that under the general 
rule a cause of action for indemnity had not yet accrued. Id. at 
218-219. 
In support of its reasoning establishing an exception to the 
general rule, it is interesting to note that the Perry Court 
referred to and discussed the Nevada Lakeshore Company decision. 
Perry, 681 P.2d at 218, citing to: Nevada Lakeshore Company v. 
Diamond Electric. Inc.. 511 P.2d 113 (Nev. 1973). 
In Nevada Lakeshore the heirs of an individual, who was 
electrocuted while swimming in the pool of an apartment complex 
brought a wrongful death action against the owner and operator of 
the pool. The owner of the pool then brought a third-party action 
seeking indemnity from the designer and installer of the electrical 
system for the pool. The trial court granted the third-party 
defendant's motion for summary judgment holding that since the pool 
had been substantially complete more than ten years prior to the 
filing of the action for wrongful death, that the third-party 
action for indemnification was barred by Nevada's six year statute 
of repose. Id. at 114. 
On appeal the trial court's ruling was affirmed. The 
appellate court reasoned that the purpose of the statue of repose 
was to offer protection from liability to the persons engaged in 
designing, planning and construction of improvements,, who would 
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otherwise fact potential liability for many years. The court 
further reasoned that it would "thwart the purpose of the 
enactment" to require a party to remain in an action under an 
indemnity theory, when it was the purpose of the statute to afford 
"ultimate repose". Nevada Lakeshore. 511 P.2d at 114. 
This Court should follow its reasoning as set forth in both 
the Perry case and in the Nevada Lakeshore case to which the Perry 
cited to with approval, and hold that Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 
is a bar to all claims brought more than seven years after the 
completion of construction, including claims for indemnification. 
Absent such a holding the statute will not provide the "ultimate 
repose" from the threat of potential liability that it was intended 
to provide. 
B. The contractual indemnification language 
is void and unenforceable because it 
violates the provisions of Utah Code Ann 
§13-8-1. 
As has been stated earlier in this brief, this Court has 
previously construed Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 to mean that an 
owner of premises can still be held liable to an injured third-
person for the owner's own torts. Good, 527 P.2d at 224. 
Therefore, if Mr. Sanchez is to prevail against Little America it 
will be as a result of a finding that Little America committed 
tortious conduct after it took possession of the premises. If 
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Little America interprets the indemnification provisions of the 
contract between them to include the requirement that Okland must 
indemnify Little America for Little America's torts committed after 
completion of the construction, then the subject indemnity clause 
violates the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §13-8-1. 
If the language of an indemnification clause purports to 
provide indemnification for the prospective indemnitee's (Little 
America's) own negligence, but the clause fails to limit the 
obligation to situations where the prospective indemnitee is not 
the sole responsible party, then "such an all encompassing 
indemnification provision is against public policy and is void and 
unenforceable" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §13-8-1. Wollam v. 
Kennecott Corp., 663 F.Supp. 268 (D.Utah 1987). The Wollam court 
held that when a indemnity provision purports to require the 
indemnitor to indemnify the indemnitee for the indemnitee's own 
negligence, the contract clause must contain language that the 
indemnitor is not required to indemnify the indemnitee if the 
indemnitee is the sole cause of the injury or damage. Id. at 272. 
There is a presumption against indemnity clauses which purport 
to require the indemnitor to indemnify the indemnitee for the 
indemnitee's own negligence, and the clause will be strictly 
construed against the indemnitee. Union Pacific Railroad v. El 
Paso Natural Gas, 408 P.2d 910 (Utah 1965). In the case of Freund 
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v, Utah Power & Light, the court noted that it had been provided 
with only three situations, where courts, applying Utah law, had 
concluded that the language of the contract required the indemnitor 
to cover for losses caused by the indemnitee's own negligence. 
Freund v. Utah Power & Light. 625 F.Supp. 272 (D.Utah 1985). The 
court in Freund noted that in all three cases the indemnity 
provisions in question included express language to the effect that 
the indemnitor would not be required to indemnify the indemnitee 
for the indemnitee's sole negligence. Id. at 278. 
The indemnity clause which Little America refers to in this 
matter reads as follows: 
4.18.1 The Contractor shall indemnify and hold 
harmless the Owner and the Architect and their 
agents and employees from and against all claims, 
damages, losses and expenses including attorneys1 
fees arising out of ,or resulting from the performance 
of the Work, provided that any such claim, damage, 
loss or expense (1) is attributable to bodily 
injury, sickness, disease or death, or to injury 
to or destruction of tangible property (other 
than the Work itself) including the loss of use 
resulting therefrom, and (2) is caused in whole 
or in part by any negligent act or omission of the 
Contractor, any Subcontractor, anyone directly or 
indirectly employed by any of them or anyone for 
whose acts any of them may be liable, regardless 
of whether or not it is caused in part by a party 
indemnified hereunder. 
The last section of the quoted language apparently attempts to make 
Okland responsible for indemnifying Little America for its own 
negligence, yet nowhere in the quoted language is there any 
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provision which would exclude Okland from having to indemnify 
Little America for its sole negligence. Therefore, the proposed 
clause is void and unenforceable pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §13-8-
1. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 does not violate either "open 
court" or "equal protection" constitutional challenges. This was 
true of the holding this Court in the case of Good v. Christensen. 
and it is still true today. This Court should not disturb the 
Good decision, but allow it to stand pursuant to the doctrine of 
stare decisis. Also, §78-12-25.5 is a bar to all claims brought 
against Okland arising out of the construction of the Little 
America Hotel, including Little America's claims for 
indemnification. Therefore, this Court should affirm both rulings 
of the trial court below granting summary judgment in favor of 
Okland. 
DATED this [^  daY o f April, 1989 
Resp^t^u^^/J|ufyfaitted, 
iy~u c i4.c 
Dwigat C. Packa 
Purser, Okazaki '& Berrett 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
Okland Construction Company 
30 \ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the jT^ day of April, 1989, I mailed four 
true and correct copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief, 
postage prepaid, by depositing copies of the same in the U.S. Mail 
to: 
Dale F. Gardiner 
Robert J. Debry 
Robert J. DeBry and Associates 
Attorney for Appellant James Sanchez 
4001 South 700 East, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Lee Henning 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSES & POWELL 
Attorneys for Respondent Higham-Hilton Mechanical 
Contractors, Inc. 
175 South West Temple, #510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Jeffrey Silvestrini 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Respondent Martin Stern, Jr., AIA Architects & 
Associates 
525 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Theodore Kannell 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorneys for Respondent Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc. 
175 South West Temple, #650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Paul Belnap 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Cross-Claimant/ Appellant Little America 
Hotel Corp. 
9 Exchange Place, #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
,1* c. 
_L 
ADDENDUM "A" 
- 3 2 -
*> ;v<^-^An Appeal from* the Judgment of the Third Judicial 
^v/iK-Defendants-Respondents -'-; .•>• •.-•a-vV'^ -ov*> .-' ••• •• •.< ••;•* 
: '§ \DEi^ $•::' :-\ %-.;i 
l ^ H E ^ O 
j /".'!$'410 Newhouse Building"^y^:^;,^;V:.v./.-,' /:'v./;)';}::,. .< 
! ^S<rtt'l£k£d 
• y^; Attorneys for Don M; Christensen, Don AL y *.v 
:
 >[ \Christensen Construction Company^ and :. [.;.,-' r. 
l^:CCotistructiqn Realty/Defendants-Respondents 
premo C o u r t , :Uf<sh ' 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE .... 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
ARGUMENT 2 
POINT I 
SECTION 78-12-25.5, U.C.A. 1953, DOES NOT 
APPLY TO THIS INSTANCE SO AS TO IM-
POSE A SEVEN YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITA-
TIONS, FROM THE DATE OF COMPLETION 
OF CONSTRUCTION, AS THAT STATUTE 
SPECIFICALLY EXEMPTS THE PLAINTIFFS 
IN THIS ACTION, AS OWNERS IN ACTUAL 
POSSESSION, FROM ITS APPLICATION 5 
POINT II 
AS SECTION 78-12-25.5 DOES NOT APPLY 
TO THE INSTANCE, THE TIME FOR THE 
COMMENCEMENT OF THE RUNNING OF 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BEGINS 
UPON THE ACCRUAL OF THE CAUSE AC-
TION, AND NOT UPON THE DATE OF 
COMPLETION OF CONSTRUCTION II 
POINT III 
THE DATE OF ACCRUAL OF THE CAUSE 
OF ACTION IN THIS INSTANCE WAS JAN-
UARY 1, 1973 16 
POINT IV 
SECTION 78-12-25.5, U.C.A. 1953, SHOULD 
NOT BE APPLIED TO THIS CASE AS THAT 
STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VIO-
LATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH AS WELL AS THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED SATES OF AMER-
ICA 17 
CONCLUSION 25 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 27 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES E. GOOD and MARY G. 
GOOD, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
DON M. CHRISTENSEN, DON M. 
CHRISTENSEN CONSTRUCTION 
CO., CONSTRUCTION REALTY, 
LEWIS C HANSEN and BILLIE J. 
HANSEN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover for damages to property-
sustained when a multi-car carport, owned by the plain-
tiffs and allegedly constructed and designed by the de-
fendants, collapsed, causing damage to the plaintiffs, 
allegedly as a result of negligent and unlawful design 
on the part of the defendants. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Upon a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants, 
the Law and Motion Court granted the respective mo-
tions of all defendants for dismissal on the grounds that 
the plaintiffs' claim was barred by the statute of limita-
tions. 
Case No. 
13659 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff-appellants seek reversal of the trial 
court's ruling that the plaintiffs' cause of action is barred 
by the statute of limitations and an order remanding 
the case to the District Court for further proceedings, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiffs in this action are the owners of an 
apartment complex which had a multi-car carport stand-
ing upon it, adjacent to the apartment complex itself. 
The carport was, admittedly, constructed prior to seven 
(7) years before the commencement of this action. The 
plaintiffs acquired their ownership interest in the apart-
menc complex on April 16, 1969. (Plaintiffs' answers to 
interrogatories.) And the plaintiffs had no knowledge 
of the defects in design and construction of the carport 
until its collapse on January 1, 1973. 
The carport collapsed, thus injuring and damaging 
the property of the plaintiffs on January 1, 1973- The 
plaintiffs contend that the collapse of the carport in 
question, and the resulting damage and injury to the 
property of the plaintiffs, was occasioned by the negli-
gence and unlawful design and construction of the carport 
by the defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
The Judge in the Law and Motion Court for the 
Third Judicial District, granted the motions to dismiss 
brought on behalf of all defendants in this actioa. The 
basis for the granting of those motions was the statute of 
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limitations. Counsel for the defendants, Don M. Chris-
tensen, dba Don M. Christensen Construction Company 
and Construction Realty based his entire argument on 
the statute of limitations. Counsel for the defendants 
Lewis G Hansen and Billie J. Hansen included in his 
argument a contention that no duty existed between those 
defendants and the plaintiff. The Court requested mem-
orandums of points and authorities on the question of 
the application of the various statutes of limitations. 
The question of lack of duty was outside the scope of 
the memorandums requested by the Court. As the mo-
tions of both sets of defendants were granted, it must be 
concluded that the Court made its ruling on the basis 
of its interpretation of the statutes of limitations, without 
regard to the question of a lack of duty. 
Additionally, as was pointed out in the memoran-
dum submitted by counsel for the defendants Christen-
sen, plaintiffs' amended complaint alleges that "the de-
fendants herein designed and constructed a multi-unit 
carport . . .," and that the said carport "was negligently 
designed and negligently constructed, and that the afore-
mentioned multi-car carport was not constructed in ac-
cordance with governmental standards and regulations 
set out for the controlling of the building and construc-
tion of such structllres.,, As such, a duty is implied under 
Utah law. Counsel for the defendants Hansen apparently 
contends that the facts are not sufficient to establish 
such a duty as he contends that his clients did not, in 
fact, participate in the design or construction of the car-
port. This matter is a matter for factual determination, 
and not the proper basis for a motion to dismiss. The 
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Utah Court has held that the pleadings in such a case 
need not anticipate all defenses possibly proposed (Nun-
nelly vs. First Federal Building and Loan Association, 
107 Utah 381, 154 P2d 620; Bennion vs. First Federal 
Savings and Loan Association, 107 Utah 381 , 154 P2d 
634) and that the import and intention of a pleading 
wil l be assumed. 
Section 385 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, 
2d ed., states as follows: 
One who on behalf of the possessor of land 
erects a structure or creates any other condition 
thereon is subject to liability to others upon or 
oucside of the land for physical ha rm caused to 
them by the dangerous character of the s tructure 
or condit ion after his work has been accepted by 
:he possessor, under the same rules as those de-
te rmin ing the liability of one who as manufacturer 
or independent contractor makes a chattel for 
the use of others-
Fur ther , Prosser, in his Handbook of the Law of 
Torts, a t Section 104, page 681 (4th ed., 1971) states as 
follows: 
I t is now the almost universal ru le that the 
contractor (builder) is liable to all those w h o may 
foreseeably be injured by the structure, not only 
w h e n he fails to disclose dangerous conditions 
k n o w n to him, bu t also when the work is negli-
gent ly done. W i t h cases cited therein: Moran 
vs. Pittsburgh - Des Moines Steel Company, 166 
F. 2d 908 ( C A . 3 - 1948), Cert, denied 334 U.S. 
846, 68 S.Ct. 1561, 92 L. ed. 1770; Hale vs. 
Depaoli, 33 Cal. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948) ; 
Hunter vs. Quality Homes, 68 A. 2d 620 (Del -
1949); Wright vs. Holland Furnace Company, 186 
Minn. 265, 243 N . W . 387. 
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The defendants in this action contend that the claim 
brought by the plaintiff is barred by the statute of limi-
tations, specifically Section 78-12-25.5 and Section 78-12-
25(2) U.C.A. 1953. 
Plaintiffs contend, and will demonstrate, that the 
seven (7) year statute of limitations imposed by Section 
78-12-25.5, U.C.A. 1953, does not apply to these plain-
tiffs as they are specifically exempted by the language 
of that statute; and that Section 78-12-25(2) U.C.A. 1953 
does apply to this situation, but that it applies from the 
date of the accrual of the action, and not from the date 
of the completion of construction. And that the accrual 
of the acuse of action took place on January I, 1973-
P O I N T I 
SECTION 78-12-25.5, U.C.A. 1953, DOES 
N O T APPLY T O T H I S INSTANCE SO AS 
T O IiMPOSE A SEVEN YEAR S T A T U T E 
OF LIMITATIONS, FROM T H E DATE 
OF COMPLETION OF C O N S T R U C T I O N , 
AS T H A T S T A T U T E SPECIFICALLY EX-
EMPTS T H E PLAINTIFFS I N T H I S AC-
T I O N , AS O W N E R S I N ACTUAL POS-
SESSION, FROM ITS A P P L I C A T I O N . 
T h e seven year statute of limitations does not apply 
in this case. Section 78-12-25.5 established a limitation 
against actions brought more than "seven years after the 
completion of construction." It has this effect, however, 
with one noticeable and important exception. The limi-
tation does not apply to persons in situations such as the 
plaintiffs herein. The fourth paragraph of Section 78-12-
25.5, U.C.A. 1953, provides as follows: 
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The limitation imposed by this provision shall 
not apply to any person in actual possession and 
control as owner, tenant or otherwise of the im-
provement at the time the defective and unsafe 
condition of such improvement constitutes the 
proximate cause of the injury for which it is pro-
posed to bring an action. 
Thus, the entire statute of limitations section that we 
are dealing with does not apply to any person in actual 
possession as owner. The plaintiffs in this case are the 
owners of the damaged property, and they were in pos-
session of the defective and unsafe condition at the time 
that the proximate cause of the injury occurred. Thus, 
this statute of limitations, 78-12-25.5, does not apply to 
the plaintiffs and that they should, therefore, be allowed 
to bring their action under other statutes of limitations 
which have as the date for the beginning of the com-
mencement of the running of the statute the date of 
accrual of the acuse of action. The plaintiffs contend that 
the above quoted language clearly applies to the situa-
tion where the owner, or other person in actual posses-
sion, is seeking recovery against the design or construc-
tion professional. Counsel for the defendants Hansen 
and counsel for the defendants Christensen contend that 
this subsection should be construed as having reference 
to actions being brought against the owner or other per-
son in possession, as opposed to actions by the owner 
against the design or construction professionals. They 
further contend that the intent of the statute is "obviously'* 
on their side. However, why would it be the intent of the 
legislature to exempt actions against owners, or other per-
sons in actual possession, since those persons are not in the 
class of person sought to be protected by the statute in 
general? The class sought to be protected is the class of 
6 
"person(s) performing or furnishing the design, planning, 
supervision of construction or construction/' 
To contrue the paragraph of the statute in question 
as proposed by the defendants would be to avoid the pur-
poses of the legislature as it would exempt the owners, 
etc., from the protection of an act in which they were 
not included. The paragraph in question would have 
to be construed as being totally without meaning. It's 
legal effect would be the same as if it had not been in-
cluded in the statute in the first place. We must conclude 
that the legislature had some purpose for the insertion 
of the paragraph in question. Therefore, it must be con-
strued as an exemption to the protection given to design 
and construction professionals. 
The plaintiffs in this action are aware of decisions 
by two courts wherein the question facing the court in 
this instance was raised. The courts that reviewed the 
question were the Supreme Court of the State of New 
Hampshire and the Superior Court of New Jersey. 
The State of New Hampshire has a six year statute 
of limitation providing protection for those designing, 
planning, supervising or constructing improvements to 
real property which contains a sentence which reads as 
follows: 
This limitation shall not apply to any person 
in actual possession and control as owner, tenant 
or otherwise of the improvement at the time the 
defective and unsafe condition of such improve-
ment constitutes the proximate cause of the injury 
for which it is proposed to bring an action. (N.H. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. Sec. 508: 4-B—1968) 
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As can be seen, this language is almost precisely 
the same as the language in the Utah statute. In 1973, 
in the case of Deschamps vs. Camp Dresser and McKee, 
Inc., 306 A.2d 771, questions of law concerning this stat-
ute, and the construction of the section were certified 
by the United States District Court for the District of 
New Hampshire to the Supreme Court of New Hamp-
shire, and the Supreme Court of New Hampshire decided 
and ruled that the import of this subsection preserves 
the right of one in possession and control to sue without 
regard to the six year statute of limitation. The question 
certified to the Supreme Court of the State of New 
Hampshire reads as follows: 
(A) Whether N. H. RSA 508: 4-B permits 'Any 
person in actual possession and control as 
owner, tenant, or otherwise of the improve-
ment at the time the defective and unsafe 
condition of such improvement constitutes 
the proximate cause of the injury for which 
it is proposed to bring an action' to bring 
suit against 'any person performing or fur-
nishing the design, planning, supervision of 
construction or construction of such improve-
ment to real property more than six years 
after the performance or furnishing of such 
services and construction?' 
The Court in that case first recognized the accepted 
proposition that ordinarily a cause of action accrues and 
begins to run at the time of the occurrence of the iajury, 
but recognized that this specific section began to run 
from the occurrence of the negligent act. They there-
after determined that the subsection in question did not 
apply to an action by an owner or other person in actual 
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possession against the design professional and that, on 
that basis, the ordinary rules pertaining to the running 
of the statute of limitations would apply, and the cause 
of action would not be barred by the statute of limita-
tions as it accrued when the injury occurred. The court 
stated their interpretation of the law, at page 773, as 
follows: 
W h e n it says that 'this limitation shall not 
apply' the court is referring to the limitation on 
plaintiffs as they are the ones who br ing 'action 
to recover damages. ' T h e exception would be 
meaningless if it were read to apply to actions 
against owners, tenants and others in possession 
and control, as defendants, because they are not 
included in the class against whom actions are 
barred by the six year limitation, namely persons 
'performing or furnishing the design, planning, 
supervision of construction or construction of the 
improvement . . . .' There would be no need to 
exclude those in possession from a class in which 
they were never included in the first place. On 
the other hand those in possession and control 
would be included in the class of persons who 
would be barred from bringing suit if it were not 
for the exception which was intended to remove 
them from that class. 
The court went on to say: 
W e hold that the second sentence of RSA 508: 
4-B preserves the right of one in possession and 
control to sue wi thout regard to the limitation of 
the first sentence. 
In the Deschamps decision, they recognized the fact 
that the N e w Jersey Court had ruled in the case of 
Salesian Society vs. Formigli Corporation, 120 N.J . Super. 
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493, 295 A.2d(1972) in a fashion contrary to their de-
cision. In rejecting the conclusions arrived at in the 
Salesian Society case, they stated as follows: 
We cannot adopt the reasoning of that case 
however, in view of what we consider to be clear 
language to the contrary. 
Plaintiffs herein agree that the language of the stat-
ute before us is clear, and further agree with the Supreme 
Court of New Hampshire that the opinion in the Salesian 
Society case is not persuasive. If the legislature had in-
tended to include the word "against" before "any person 
in actual possession and control as owner, tenant, or 
otherwise," as the New Jersey Court argues, the legisla-
ture could have easily done so. To insert the word 
"against" is to legislate in what we believe is contrary 
to the intention of the legislature. 
Therefore, it can be seen that the paragraph in ques-
tion exempts actions by owners and against design or 
construction professionals from the application of the 
seven year statute of limitations. To state that the para-
graph in question exempts actions against owners (with-
out any regard to design or construction professions) is 
to render the paragraph meaningless. The statute of limi-
tations designated as 78-12-25.5 simply does not apply 
to actions by owners in possession against design or con-
struction professionals. Thus it does not apply to the 
plaintiffs in this action. 
As a result of the fact that the plaintiffs in this 
action are exempt from the application of the sevea year 
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statute of limitations the standard statutes of limitations 
are brought into play, and the date for the commence-
ment of the running of those statutes of limitations is the 
date of the "accrual of the action," 
POINT II 
AS SECTION 78-12-25.5 DOES NOT AP-
PLY TO THIS INSTANCE, THE TIME 
FOR THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE 
RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMI-
TATIONS BEGINS UPON THE AC-
CRUAL OF THE CAUSE ACTION, AND 
NOT UPON THE DATE OF COMPLE-
TION OF CONSTRUCTION. 
As Section 78-12-25.5 does not apply to the cir-
cumstances of this case, plaintiffs contend that Section 
78-12-25.5(2), with its four year statute of limitations, 
control the action. Plaintiffs further contend that Sec-
tion 78-12-25(2) commences to run from the date of the 
accrual of the action. Plaintiffs do not seek to have that 
section modified in any way, and in fact, insist that the 
standard rules that apply to that section be applied in 
this instance. Plaintiffs have specific reference to the 
controlling legal concept that causes of action accrue 
when the injury occurs. 
In the introductory section to the limitations of ac-
tions chapter of Title 78, Utah Code Anno., we find the 
following guideline: 
78-12-1. Time for commencement of actions gen-
erally. — Civil Actions can be commenced only 
within the periods prescribed in this chapter, 
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after the cause of action shall have accruedf except 
where in special cases a different limitation is 
prescribed by statute. (Emphasis added) 
Thus Section 78-12-25-5 cannot be used to modify 
the nature of when a cause of action shall have accrued 
under Section 78-12-25(2). Section 78-12-25(2) provides: 
This provision shall not be construed as extend-
ing or limiting the periods otherwise prescribed 
by the laws of this state for the bringing of any 
action. 
In accordance with that provision, the plaintiffs 
herein contend that the standard rules for the dating of 
:he accrual of a cause of action must apply to Section 
78-12-25(2). 
As was pointed out in the Deschamps Case, supra., 
sxzXMtos of limitations on design and construction profes-
sionals are different from most all other statutes of 
limitations in that they run from a specific point in time 
rather than from the time of an injury. In fact, the 
statute of limitations received strong support during the 
1960's for passage from architects, engineers and others 
in the construction fields because the potential liability 
against them could have gone on continuously as causes 
of action do not arise until injuries occur. In the Des-
champs Case, the court recognized this fact and stated as 
follows: 
The unique feature of RSA 508: 4-b which dis-
tinguishes it from most statutes of limitations in 
negligence actions is that the time begins to run 
from the time the services are performed rather 
than from the time of injury. Causes of action 
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for negligence do not arise at the occurrence of 
the negligent act but rather when the damages 
result. 
A recovery is not possible until a cause of action 
exists. Further, a cause of action does not exist until 
conduct causes injury that produces loss or damage. No 
recovery is possible until damages have occurred. Dam-
ages are an integral part of any cause of action, and no 
cause of action exists until damages occur. Saylor vs. 
Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218. In the instant case, the plaintiffs 
suffered no injury until the date that the damages to 
them occurred. 
This contention is supported by the U.S. Supreme 
Court case of United States vs. Wurts, 303 U.S. 4 l4 (1930) 
where the court recognized the natural date of commence-
ment for a cause of action and stated, at page 418, as 
follows: 
It would require language so clear as to leave 
room for no other reasonable construction in order 
to induce the belief that Congress intended a 
statute of limitations to begin to run before the 
right barred by it has accrued. 
An action based upon negligence accrues when force 
is wrongfully put in motion producing injury. (Konar 
vs. Monro Muffler Shops, Inc., 280 N.Y.S. 2d 812, (1967). 
See also Dalton vs. Dow Chemical Company, 158 N.W. 
2d 580 (Minn. 1968); Rosenaw vs. New Brunswick, 238 
A2d 169 (1968); White vs. Schnoebelen, 18 A2d 185 
(N. H. 1941)) The following is found in the Kentucky 
Law Journal in Volume 60 at page 462 (1972): 
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Therefore, the basic premise underlying any 
theory of limitations is that the cause of action 
must accrue before the time period begins to run. 
The cause of action is said to accrue at different 
times for different actions, that statutes uniformly 
hold that the time limitation does not begin to 
run until after the plaintiff has suffered injury 
and thus has acquired the right to sue. 
51 Am Jur 2d at page 703 sets out the general rule 
as to when a cause of action accrues in tort actions as 
follows: 
The general rule that the statute of limitations 
begins to run from the time that the cause of ac-
tion accrues is fully applicable to tort actions, 
and, as regards the running of the statute of limi-
tations applicable to torts, a cause of action ac-
crues only when the force wrongfully put in mo-
tion produces injury, the invasion of personal or 
property rights occurring at that time. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of State Tax Com-
mission vs. Spanish fork, 99 Utah 177, 100 P.2d 575, 
stated the law in Utah with reference to the accrual of 
a cause of action as follows: 
The question is then, when did the cause of ac-
tion accrue? The general rule is that it accrues 
at the time it becomes remediable in the courts, 
that is when the claim is in such condition that 
the courts can receive and give judgment if the 
claim is established. (See cases cited therein.) 
It is certainly true that the courts cannot proceed and 
give judgment against any person if there are no dam-
ages, and if no injury has occurred. Thus, a cause of 
action does not accrue until injury takes place. See also 
O'Hair v>. Kounalis, 23 Utah 2d 355. 
14 
In the 1968 case of Christiansen vs Reese, 20 Ut. 2d 
199, 436 P.2d 435, the Utah Supreme Court, in a medical 
malpractice action, ruled that the statute of limitations 
commenced to run when the patient learned of the pres-
ence of a foreign object in his body. Though the court 
did not adopt what is commonly referred to as "discovery 
rule," it also held that the date of commencement of the 
accrual of the cause of action would not be the date of 
the negligent act of the physician. The court left the 
question of whether or not the patient commenced an 
action within four years after he knew, or should have 
known, of the presence of a surgical needle in his body, 
as an issue to be resolved by the jury. The court stated 
the proposition as follows: 
Therefore, we now hold that, regardless of prior 
pronouncements, where a foreign object is negli-
gently left in the body of a patient during an opera-
tion, and the patient is ignorant of the fact, and 
consequently of his right of action for malpractice, 
the cause of action does not accrue until the patient 
learned of the presence of such foreign object in 
his body. . . . However, upon the record it is our 
judgment that the question of whether the plain-
tiff commenced his action within four years after 
he knew, or should have known, of the presence 
of the surgical needle in his body is an issue to be 
resolved by the trial of the facts. 
Thus it can be seen that Utah follows the normal rule 
of law in the question as to when a cause of action accrues. 
A cause of action cannot accrue until it is fully remedi-
able in the courts. A remedy cannot be provided until 
damage and injury occur. 
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POINT III 
THE DATE OF ACCRUAL OF THE CAUSE OF 
ACTION IN THIS INSTANCE WAS JAN-
UARY 1, 1973. 
The cause of action belonging to the plaintiff in this 
case accrued on January 1, 1973. On that date, the plain-
tiffs first learned of the defects in design and workmanship 
that existed in the carport in question. On that date, they 
also suffered damages to their property. 
Prior to January 1, 1973, no cause of action existed. 
Additionally, no right to collect damages existed. There 
is no evidence that the plaintiffs knew, or should have 
I nown. of the potentially dangerous situation. Further, 
there is no contention of such prior knowledge raised by 
the defendants. Thus the question of discovery is not an 
issue in this action. 
Because of the fact that the plaintiffs were not en-
titled to recover damages against the defendants until 
after January 1, 1973, and because of the fact that they 
were not aware of the defects in workmanship and design 
until that date, the cause of action in this matter did not 
arise until January 1, 1973. Therefore, the statute of limi-
tations, as set out in Section 78-12-25(2) U.C.A. 1953, did 
not commence to run until January 1, 1973, and the com-
plaints against the respective defendants in this action 
were filed well within the time alloted by that statute of 
limitations. 
16 
POINT IV 
SECTION 78-12-25.5, U.CA. 1953, SHOULD 
NOT BE APPLIED TO THIS CASE AS THAT 
STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VIO-
LATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH AS WELL AS THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 
The seven year statute of limitations, which com-
mences to run from the date of completion of construc-
tion, is violative of constitutional requirements because 
it stems from a total change and departure from the tra-
ditional method of applying and enforcing statutes of 
limitations. This substantial change, when put into ef-
fect, was done so without adequate reference and rela-
tions to the constitutional requirements involved. Plain-
tiffs contend that such a review and such requirements can-
not be ignored without prejudicing rights guaranteed and 
assured by the Constitution of the State of Utah and the 
United States of America. 
Though the Court need not face the question of con-
stitutionality, because this Section (78-12-25.5) does not 
apply to these plaintiffs on its face, the Section is mani-
festly unconstitutional. 
Unlike almost all other statutes of limitations in 
Utah, this Section sets as the commencement date for the 
running of the statute the date of "the completion of con-
struction/' As such it can have the effect of extinguishing 
a cause of action before that cause of action comes into 
existence. This is a violation of the due process and equal 
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protection provisions of the 14th Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States, as well as Sections 2, 7, and 
11 of Article I of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
Section 2 of Article I of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah guarantees equal protection; Section 7 assures due 
process of law; and Section 11 provides that : 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for in-
jury done to him in his person, property or reputa-
tion, shall remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unneces-
sary delay; . . . . 
Section 78-12-25.5 denies a remedy for an injury done 
to a person before the injury occurs and before the cause 
or action accrues and thus violates the provisions of Sec-
tion 11 of the Constitution of the State of Utah and in 
turn violates the due process and equal protection provi-
sions of the Constitution of the State of Utah and the Con-
sti tution of the United States. Those consti tutional provi-
sions place limitations upon the legislature to prevent them 
from closing the doors of the courts to persons w h o would 
otherwise have a legally enforceable r ight under a known 
remedy. Brown vs. Wrigbtman, 47 Utah 31 , 151 Pac. 
366. Except for the provisions of Section 78-12-25.5 per-
sons with injuries such as the plaintiffs' in this section, 
would have a right to enforce their remedy under known 
and accepted concepts of law. 
Section 28 of the Limitation of Actions Top ic of 51 
Am Jur 2d at page 613 states the general lata in this area 
as follows: 
However, all statutes of limitation mus t proceed 
on the theory that the party has full oppor tuni ty 
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afforded him to try his rights in the courts, and 
where a statute of limitations would operate so 
as to bar all recovery without any allowance of 
time for the commencement thereof in failure, it 
is usually deemed to be unconstitutional in its 
operation on vested rights. It is not within the 
power of the legislature, under the guise of a limi-
tation provision, to cut off an existing remedy 
entirely, since this would amount to a denial of 
justice, . . . . 
Cases cited therein. 
Statutes of limitations against architects, engineers 
and designers and others in the building industry differ 
widely from state to state. A number of state legislatures 
have attempted to avoid the question of constitutionality 
by having the statute only apply to patent as opposed to 
latent defects (such as Miss Code Ann. Section 720.5-supp. 
1969), or where there is fraud (Ark. Stat. Ann. Section 37-
242-Supp. 1967); (Tenn. Code Ann. Section 28-317-supp. 
1967), and others provide for the contribution or indem-
nity by owners or others responsible against designers and 
contractors after the limitation period has run (N. J. 
Stat. Ann. Section 2A:l4-l.l-supp. 1968; N. C. Gen. 
Stat. Section l-50(5)-supp. 1965; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, 
Section 65.1 (4)-supp. 1969; Wise. Stat. Ann. Section 
893.155 - 1966). Statutes vary from state to state in terms 
of who is protected, what time limitation is imposed, when 
the commencement event will be, as well as in other 
aspects. Such distinctions are apparently a result of an 
attempt to have the statute of limitations in each state 
interact appropriately with the rest of the state's compre-
hensive limitations of action statutes. The California 
statute, for example, establishes a four year period, but 
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limits its effect to tort or contracts actions arising out of 
patent deficiencies only. It further totally exempts owner-
occupied single unit residences from the application of 
limitation. (Cal. Civ. Pro. Code Section 337.1(f)-West 
Supp. 1968). 
Th ree states, whose statutes are similar in many re-
spects to Utah 's statutes, have, in fact, ruled such statutes 
of l imitations unconsti tutional. In the first of these, the 
Illinois Supreme Court in 1967 in the case of Skinner vs. 
Anderson, 38 111. 2d 455; 231 N.E. 2d 588, held Sec-
tion 29 of the Illinois' Limitation Act, referring to 
design professionals and contractors, unconsti tut ional . 
Tha t action was brought by a widow and mother of two 
persons killed when, because of lack of venti lat ion, refrig-
eration gases leaked into a boiler room, corroded the 
burner and caused lethal gas to escape, thus causing the 
death of the husband and daughter , against the bui lding 
contractor and architect and a service repa i rman. The 
Illinois Supreme Court reversed the lov/er cour t decision, 
which imposed the statute of limitations, on the basis that 
the statute of limitations violated Section 22, Article IV of 
the Illinois Constitution, which provided that the legisla-
ture should not pass any local or "special laws . . . grant-
ing to any corporation, association or individual any spe-
cial or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise what-
ever ." (It should be here noted that Utah has an almost 
exactly similar statute which provides, in Article VI Sec-
tion 26 as follows: 
T h e legislature is prohibited from enact ing any 
private or special laws in the fol lowing cases: . . . 
(16) Grant ing to any individual, association or cor-
poration any privilege, immunity or franchise.) 
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The Illinois Supreme Court stated that the constitutional 
provisions required legislative classifications to be rea-
sonably related to legislative purchase and that the statute 
of limitations violated the State Constitution because it 
omitted and denied recovery arbitrarily and because the 
classifications were not rational. The court recognized 
that the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment 
does not deny a state the power to classify, but prohibits 
classification without any reasonable basis. Not ing that 
the statute applied to design professionals and contrac-
tors, but not to materialism, the court in the Skinner Case, 
concluded that the classification therein was unreasonable, 
for either class' negligence dur ing construction might 
cause injury within the four year period. T h e classifica-
tion thus provided an immunity for suit after the four 
year period to one classification, design professionals and 
contractors, while denying it to another, materialism. (See 
21 N.E. 2d 5 8 S a t 5 9 D 
In 1973, the Court of Appeals in Kentucky, in the 
case of Saylor vs. Hall, 497 S.W. 2d 2 IS, held another 
statute similar to that which Utah has, unconstitutional. 
T h e Saylor Case was an action for damages by tenants 
against the builder, seeking to recover for the death of 
one son of the tenant and injury to another caused by the 
collapse of a fireplace. The statute of limitations in that 
state provided a five year statute of limitations which 
began to run at the date of the original occupancy of the 
improvements which the builder caused to be erected. 
T h e home was constructed in 1955, and the injury to the 
plaintiffs' children occurred in 1969, well after the time 
period set in the statute of limitations had run. The statute 
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of limitations specifically provided that no actions sound-
ing in tort resulting from a deficiency in construction of 
any improvement to real property should be brought 
after the expiration of the five year period. 
The Kentucky Court ruled that its statute of limita-
tion was unconstitutional because it violated a section of 
the State Constitution which provided as follows: 
Constitution Section 14. All courts shall be open 
and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, and right in justice 
administered without sale, denial or delay. 
'It should be noted that this section is substantially simi-
lar to Section 11 of Article I of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah, as set out hereinabove.) In arriving at its 
decision, the Kentucky Court reasoned as follows: 
In our view, the application of these statutory ex-
pressions as to the claims here asserted destroys, 
pro tanto, a common-law right of action for negli-
gence that proximately causes personal injury or 
death, which existed at the times the statutes were 
enacted. The statutory expressions as they relate to 
actions based on negligence perform an abortion on 
the right of action, not in the first trimester, but 
before conception. The right of action for negli-
gence proximately causing injury or death, which 
is constitutionally protected in this state, requires 
more than mere conduct before recovery can be 
attempted. Recovery is not possible until a cause 
of action exists. A cause of action does not exist 
until the conduct causes injury that produces loss 
or damage. The action for negligence evolved 
chiefly out of the old common-law form of action 
on the case, and it has always retained the rule 
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of that action, that proof of damage was an essen-
tial part of die plaintiffs' case. (See 497 S.W. 2d 
218 at page 224-225.) 
Note that the court here recognizes the common-law rule 
as to when a cause of action accrues. To support that 
proposition, it cites Prosser, Handbook of the Law of 
Torts, Section 30, page 143 (4th eq., 1971). 
T h e court went on to say as follows: 
Surely then, the application of proported limita-
tion statutes in such manner as to destroy a cause 
of action before it legally exists cannot be permissi-
ble if it accomplishes destruction of a constitution-
ally protected right of action. 
Later in 1973, the Hawai i Supreme Court in the case 
cf Fujioka vs. Kam, 514 P.2d 568, ruled that the Hawai i 
statute of limitations protecting persons providing the 
"licensed services in the design, planning, supervision or 
observation of construction or construction of an im-
provement to real property , , as unconstitutional and vio-
lative of rules against special laws and of the equal pro-
tection guarantees of the United States Constitution and 
the Constitution of the State of Hawaii . In that action, a 
plaintiff minor sought recovery for damages against the 
owners of a bui lding and the owners in turn filed a third-
party complaint against the engineer and general contrac-
tor involved in the construction of the bui lding where a 
roof collapsed and injured the minor plaintiff. A period 
of more than ten years, the period set out in the statute of 
limitations, had run between the completion of the build-
ing and the collapse of the roof, and the lower courts 
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granted a motion for summary judgment brought by the 
engineer and general contractor. The owners, on appeal, 
for the first time, challenged the constitutionality of the 
statute. The court agreed with their contention that the 
statute was unconstitutional, and stated as follows: 
The statute on one hand grants immunity to the 
engineer and the contractor, who should or would 
be, but for the statute, primarily responsible for 
the injuries. On the other hand, the owners are bur-
dened with the liability for the damages proxi-
mately caused by the negligence of the engineer 
and the contractor that, under the common-law 
rule in this jurisdiction, the owners are under a 
duty to use reasonable care for the safety of all 
persons reasonably expected to be on the premises. 
(Cases cited) In spite of this unfair result the engi-
neer and the contractor contend that the statute 
does not violate the equal protection guarantee of 
the State Constitution. 
. . . We are unable to see any rational basis for 
treating the engineer and the contractor differently 
from the owners under the same circumstances. 
It is clear that the classification does not rest upon 
some reasonable consideration of differences (be-
tween the classes under the same circumstances), 
which have a fair and substantial relation to the 
object of the legislation. Nor is the classification 
founded upon a reasonable distinction or difference 
necessitated by state policy. A statute making such 
an unsupportable classification fails to meet the 
requirements of the equal protection guarantee. 
Morey vs. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465-469, 77 Ct. 
1344, I L. ed. 2d 1485 (and other cases cited there-
in). 
It can therefore be seen that states with statutes com-
parable to the Utah statute of limitations, with consti-
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tutional provisions very nearly the same as those found in 
the Utah State Constitution, have determined that such 
statutes of limitations as we have here to protect archi-
tects, engineers, design professionals and contractors, are 
unconstitutional. The plaintiffs herein, James E. Good 
and Mary G. Good, contend that the Utah State statute of 
limitations is also unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
The provisions of the seven year statute of limitations 
against architects and design and construction profession-
als, as found in Section 78-12-25.5 U . C A . 1953, does not 
apply in the instant case because the plaintiffs herein are 
"owners or others in actual possession." Their cause of 
action is not controlled by the limitation. Thus , we must 
turn to the other statutes of limitations that would apply 
in this instance. T h a t statute is the limitation provision 
found in 78-12-25(2). And it does not commence to run 
unti l the cause of action accrues. Thus , it did not com-
mence to run until January 1, 1973, because of the fact 
that a cause of action does not accrue unti l injury and 
damage is sustained. 
Thus it is the position of the plaintiffs in this action 
that their cause of action againt the defendants is not 
barred by any statute of limitations in Utah. And, in the 
event that it were, that such a bar would be violative of 
the provisions of the Utah State Constitution and of the 
Constitution of the United States of America. 
The trial court erred in gran t ing defendants' motions 
for a dismissal. It so erred in failing to accurately con-
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strue the language of Section 78-12-25.5. The trial court 
erred further in failing to rule that the statute of limita-
tions in question is unconstitutional. 
Wherefore, plaintiffs-appellants respectfully pray 
that the trial court's judgment of dismissal be reversed 
and that the case be remanded to the District Court for 
further proceedings and that the plaintiff-appellants be 
awarded their costs herein. 
TIM DALTON DUNN, for: 
HANSON, WADSWORTH & RUSSON 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
26 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that two (2) copies of this brief were 
mailed, postage prepaid, to Guy Burningham, Attorney 
for Lewis C Hansen and Billie J. Hansen, Defendants-
Respondents, 1610 Walker Bank Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111 and Dean E. Conder, Attorney for Don M. 
Christensen, Don M. Christensen Construction Company 
and Construction Realty, Defendapts^Hespondents, 410 
Newhouse Building, Salt Lake Q t ^ U t a h 84111. 
TIM DALTON DUNN 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
27 
ADDENDUM " B " 
|BRIEFjOF|RESPONDENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
ARGUMENT 2 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS ARE BARJRED 
FROM BRINGING THIS ACTION BY SEC-
TION 78-12-25.5 OF THE UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED (1973 SUPP.) 2 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THIS COURT SHOULD DECIDE 
THAT THE PLAINTIFFS' ACTION IS NOT 
BARRED IN THE PROVISIONS OF 78-12-
25.5, THE FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMI-
TATIONS AT SECTION 73-12-25 (2) IS AN 
EFFECTIVE BAR TO PLAINTIFFS' COM-
PLAINT 10 
POINT III 
SECTION 78-12-25.5 OF THE UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED IS A VALID AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL EXPRESSION OF THE LEGISLA-
TIVE POLICY DECISION THAT THERE 
SHOULD NOT BE LIABILITY FOR AN IN-
DEFINITE PERIOD IN A CASE OF ALLEGED 
DEFECTIVE CONSTRUCTION 13 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
Page 
TABLE OF STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-12-1 13 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-12-25 (2) 2, 10, 13 
Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-12-25.5 (1973 Supp.) . . . .1 , 2, 3, 4, 13, 14 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-60 14 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 15 
MISCELLANEOUS 
50 Am. Jur., Statutes, Section 227 9 
Comment, "Limitations of Actions Statutes for Archi-
tects and Builders — Blueprints for Non-ac-
tion," 18 Catholic U. L. Rev. 361, (1969) 8 
Hearing No. 7 on H.R. 6527, H.R. 6678, and H.R. 
11544 before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House 
Committee on the District of Columbus, 90th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 11, 24, 29 (1967)- 8 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES E. GOOD and MARY G. 
GOOD, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
DON M. CHRISTENSEN, DON M. 
CHRISTENSEN CONSTRUCTION CO., 
CONSTRUCTION REALTY, LEWIS C 
HANSEN and BILLIE J. HANSEN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
S T A T E M E N T OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs-Appellants brought suit in the District 
Court for Salt Lake County alleging the negligent design 
and construction of a multi-car carport which plaintiffs 
alleged had been designed and constructed by Defend-
ants Don M. Christensen, Don M. Christensen Construc-
tion Company, and Construction Realty, which was origi-
nally built for Defendants Lewis C. Hansen and Billie J. 
Hansen, more than seven years previously. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER C O U R T 
Defendants-Respondents moved for Summary Judg-
ment alleging that the seven-year statute of limitations set 
forth in Section 78-12-25.5 of the Utah Code Annotated 
Case No. 
13659 
1 
(1973 Supp.) and the four-year statute of limitations set 
forth in Section 78-12-25(2) of the Utah Code Annotated 
(1973 Supp.) barred Plaintiffs-Appellants' action, and 
the Lower Court granted Defendants-Respondents' mo-
tions. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-Respondents seek denial of Plaintiffs' 
appeal and affirmance of the Order entered by the Lower 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants Don M, Christen-
ben, Don M. Christensen Construction Company and Con-
struction Realty (hereinafter "Christensen") designed and 
constructed a multi-car carport in 1965. Defendants Lewis 
C. Hansen and Billie J. Hansen (hereinafter "Hansen") 
were the parties in actual possession and control as owners 
at the time the carport was designed and constructed. In 
1969, Plaintiffs James E. Good and Mary G. Good acquired 
an ownership interest in the carport. On January 1, 1973, 
subsequent to a heavy snowfall, which caused ejctensive 
damage throughout the area, the carport collapsed. This 
action was not commenced until more than seven years 
after the construction of the carport. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS ARE BAR-
RED FROM BRINGING THIS ACTION BY 
SECTION 78-12-25.5 OF THE UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED (1973 SUPP.). 
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Section 78-12-25.5 of the Utah Code Annotated (1973 
Supp.) is specifically intended to cover the situation in 
the instant case. The statute reads as follows: 
"INJURY DUE T O DEFECTIVE DESIGN 
OR CONSTRUCTION OF IMPROVEMENT T O 
REAL PROPERTY — W I T H I N SEVEN YEARS. 
— No action to recover damages for any injnry 
to property, real or personal, or for any injury to 
the person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, 
arising out of the defective and unsafe condition 
of an improvement to real property, nor any action 
for damages sustained on account of such injury, 
shall be brought against any person performing or 
furnishing the design, planning, supervision of con-
struction or construction of such improvement to 
real property more than seven years after the com-
pletion of construction. 
"(1) 'Person' shall mean an individual, cor-
poration, partnership, or any other legal entity. 
(2) Completion of construction for the pur-
poses of this act shall mean the date of issuance of 
a certificate of substantial completion by the own-
er, architect, engineer or other agents, or the date 
of the owner 's use or possession of the improve-
ment on real property. 
" T h e limitation imposed by this provision 
shall not apply to any person in actual possession 
and control as owner, tenant or otherwise, of the 
improvement at the time the defective and unsafe 
condition of such improvement constitutes the 
proximate cause of the injury for which it is pro-
posed to br ing an action. 
"This provision shall not be construed as ex-
tending or limiting the periods otherwise prescrib-
ed by the laws of this state for the bringing of any 
action." (Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-12-25.5 
(1973 Supp.) (Emphasis added) 
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The preamble to this Act was adopted by the Legis-
lature and explains the statute as follows: 
"An Act Enacting a New Section 78-12-25.5 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Relating to the Limi-
tations of Actions by Providing a Time Limit in 
Which Actions for Injury to Property or Death 
Must Be Brought Against Persons Who Perform-
ed or Furnished the Design, Planning, Supervision 
or Construction of Improvements on Real Prop-
erty/' (Laws of Utah, 1967, Chapter 218) 
Section 78-12-25.5 is an expression of the legislative 
policy decision that there should not be indefinite liability 
in cases such as the instant one. This determination is 
within the discretion of the Legislature. It determines that 
if no cause of action arises within seven years from the date 
of construction of an improvement to real property that 
the expiration of that time period is prima facie evidence 
that there was no faulty construction. This determination 
is to give effect to the legislative policy decision to bar 
litigation arising out of actions which occurred a longer 
time prior to the institution of the litigation than the 
number of years of the applicable statute of limitations. 
Similar statutes are applicable in all areas of the law. 
The legislative intent in enacting this statute was to avoid 
spurious claims, to put a limit on the amount of time in 
which a party can rely on construction defects without 
taking into consideration the necessary subsequent main-
tenance of such property, and to avoid the obvious prob-
lems regarding the admission of evidence years after the 
activity in question. 
The Supreme Court said in the case of Price v. Tattle, 
70 Utah 156, 258 Pac. 1016 (1927): 
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"(1) In the construction of statutes it is the 
duty of courts to ascertain the intent of the legisla-
tive body and, if the legislation is within the con-
stitutional power of the Legislature, to enforce 
that intent. In determining the intent of legis-
lation not only the language of the act may be con-
sidered, but the purposes or objects sought by the 
Legislature should be and are considered by the 
courts in determining the legislative intent." 
A case closely analogous to the instant case is Joseph 
v. Burns, 260 Ore. 493, 491 P.2d 203, (1971). In this 
case, the owners and others brought an action against the 
architects and engineers for damages resulting from a 
collapsed roof. The Oregon limitations law provided that 
no action could be brought more than ten years after the 
"act or omission complained of." The Oregon Supreme 
Court held that the ten-year statute of limitations applied 
". . . . from the date of the act or omission regardless 
of when the damage resulted or when the act or omission 
was discovered." 
The Washington Supreme Court reached a similar 
decision in the case of Yakima Frz/it & Cold Storage Co. 
v. Central Heat & P. Co., 81 Wash. 2d 528, 503 P.2d 108, 
(1972). In that decision, the Court discussed a similar 
Washington statute involving actions arising out of de-
fects in improvements to real property. The Court held 
that real property improvement, namely, the re-installa-
tion of pipes, coils, hangers, and rods that replaced those 
which had been a part of the cold storage warehouse build-
ing for forty years, was completed in 1961, but where the 
suit against the contractor was not instituted until after 
a portion of that cold storage system and equipment had 
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collapsed in 1968, the suit was barred by the statute of 
limitations because the cause of action did not accrue 
within six years of the date of the completion of the work 
by the contractor. The Court in Yakima pointed out that 
since 1961 more than twenty states have enacted similar 
statutes to actions arising out of defects in improvements 
to real property. The Court also pointed out that in the 
case of Skinner v. Anderson, 38 111. 2d 455, 231 N.E. 588, 
(1967) (also cited by Plaintiffs) the Illinois Court de-
clared the Illinois statute unconstitutional as being special 
legislation in favor of only architects and contractors. The 
Washington Court distinguished the statute cited in the 
Yakima case from the statute in the Skinner case because 
che scope of the Washington statute is not limited as co 
vocation. The Utah statute is also not limited as to voca-
tion. The Utah statute bars actions against any person 
performing or furnishing the design, planning, super-
vision of construction, or construction of an improvement 
to real property. 
In the case of Salesian Society v. Formigli Corpora-
tion, 120 N J . Super. 493, 295 A.2d 19, (1972), in a suit 
by a building owner more than thirteen years after con-
struction against a contraaor and sub-contractor where 
the applicable statute limited the time period for bringing 
such action to ten years, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
held that this statute was not a statute of limitations but 
rather "the statute prevents from ever arising a cause of 
action against members of the protected class at a given 
point in time. , , 
6 
By looking at the preamble and the body of the 
statute together, we see that the obvious intent of the 
Legislature was to place a seven-year statute of limitations 
on the claims for anyone suffering injury or death by a 
person who built, designed, planned, or supervised con-
struction or improvement on real property. This statute 
applies specifically to the conduct here in question. This , 
as a specific statute versus the broad statute of any ". . . 
action for relief not otherwise provided for by law," 
should take precedence over that broader statute where the 
action comes within its provisions. Plaintiffs' a rgument 
that this statute does not apply refers only to the fourth 
paragraph. In that paragraph, by limiting this statute with 
respect to owners and persons in actual possession or con-
trol of the property, the Legislature is saying that the per-
son who is in possession or control at the time of the crea-
tion of the "defective and unsafe condit ion" does not come 
within these provisions. This is an exception made by the 
Legislature based on the policy that the owner at the time 
of the construction and the creation of the "defective and 
unsafe condition" should be exempt from this seven-year 
statute of limitations. The persons in actual possession 
and control at the time of construction and completion of 
construction were not Plaintiffs Good. Defendants 
Hansen had possession at the time of construction. 
Thus , if there was any defective and unsafe condi-
tion created, it was created dur ing the possession and 
ownership of Hansens. 
In the case of Salesian Society vs. Formigli Corpora-
tion, supra, the New Jersey Court was required to inter-
pret a clause in the New Jersey statute which is identical 
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to the clause brought into question by the Plaintiff in the 
instant case. After a lengthy discussion within which the 
Court referred to Comment, "Limitation of Actions Stat-
utes for Architects and Builders — Blueprints for Non-
action," 18 Catholic U. L. Rev. 361, (1969), and Hearing 
No. 7 on H.R. 6527, H.R. 6678, and H.R. 11544 before 
Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the Dis-
trict of Columbia, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 11, 24, 29, 
(1967), the Court then went on to hold that Mthe legisla-
tive intent was to insulate contractors, architects, planners 
and designers from all claims, whether in tort or in con-
tract . . . ." What the Legislature intended to preserve 
was the right to make a claim against a person "in actual 
possession or control as owner, tenant or otherwise/' at the 
time of the creation of the defective condition. 
The effect of this clause in this statute is that potential 
liability for dangerous conditions is left on the owner or 
other person in possession if an injury is caused by circum-
stances giving rise to a cause of action. The Legislature 
meant to exclude from liability persons (such as Defend-
ants herein) who have been long out of possession and 
without the right or duty to make inspections and re-
pairs for conditions that may be discovered within the 
seven-year time period. 
Since the Plaintiffs were not in possession, they were 
cut off by the preceding parts of this statute. Any other 
construction would lead to an almost total obliteration of 
the statute. It would mean that only trespassers or stran-
gers would have the law extended from the four-year stat-
ute of limitations to a seven-year statute. It is the function 
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of the courts to give legal effect to the intent of the Legis-
lature, not to thwart the obvious legislative intent. (See 50 
Am. Jur . , Statutesj Section 227; Parkinson v. State 
Bank, 84 Utah 278, 35 P.2d 814, (1934), 94 ALR 112; 
A. Booth & Co. v. Weigand, 30 Utah 135, 83 Pac. 734, 
(1906); Rospigliosi v. Glenallen Mining Co., 69 Utah 4 1 , 
452 Pac. 276, (1926); Price v. Tuttle, supra. 
A statute identical to the Utah statute was upheld in 
N e w Jersey in the case of Rosenberg v. North Bergen Tp., 
61 N J . 190, 293 A.2d 662, (1972), in which the Court 
held: 
" T h e injured party has literally no cause of 
action. The harm that has been done is damnum 
absque injuria — a wrong for which the law af-
fords no redress. T h e function of the statute is thus 
rather to define substantive rights rather than to 
alter or modify a remedy. A legislature is entirely 
at liberty to enact new laws or abolish old ones as 
long as no vested r ight is disturbed." 
In that case that statute was attacked on exactly the 
same grounds as Plaintiff is at tacking this statute in the 
instant case. T h a t statute was upheld and Plaintiff was 
denied his r ight of action in that statute. 
Plaintiff relies on Descbar?ips v. Camp Dresser & 
McKee, Inc., (N. Hamp.) 306 A.2d 771, (1973). Tha t is 
the only case Defendants have found supporting Plain-
tiffs, and since it does not give sufficient facts to determine 
whether or not it is distinguishable from the instant case 
and no authority or reasoning is therein cited to support 
that Court 's decision, Defendants find that case less than 
persuasive. 
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The Legislature intended that this statute govern this 
particular type of action and therefore the Court should 
affirm the Lower Court's decision that this statute does 
govern the instant case. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THIS COURT SHOULD DECIDE 
THAT THE PLAINTIFFS' ACTION IS NOT 
BARRED IN THE PROVISIONS OF 78-12-
25.5, THE FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMI-
TATIONS AT SECTION 78-12-25 (2) IS AN 
EFFECTIVE BAR TO PLAINTIFFS' COM-
PLAINT 
Plaintiffs allege that Section 78-12-25 (2) which pro-
vides for a four-year statute of limitations is applicable 
and that the four-year period runs from the time of the 
discovery of the alleged defect or when with reasonable 
diligence the alleged defect should have been discovered. 
Plaintiffs allege that the carport in question was unlaw-
fully designed and constructed because it failed to com-
ply with local building code requirements. l a the Plain-
tiffs' answer to Interrogatory No. 6, specific items are 
alleged to have been structurally inadequate. Since Plain-
tiffs' cause of action is based upon structural defects, those 
defects should have been obvious to Plaintiffs at the time 
they took possession of the property. The construction 
work complained of was open and obvious to anyone 
looking at it. There was no concealment or hidden de-
fect. Anyone in possession knew or should have known 
of its defective condition at that time. Therefore, the 
cause of action accrued at the time of completion of that 
construction. In the case of State Tax Commission v. Span-
10 
ish Fork, 99 Utah 177, 100 P.2d 575, (1940), cited at page 
14 of Plaintiffs' brief, the Court stated as follows: 
"The question is then, when did the cause of 
action accrue? The general rule is that it accrues 
at the time it becomes remediable in the courts, 
that is when the claim is in such condition that the 
courts can receive and give judgment if the claim 
is established." 
Assuming arguendo that the carport had been negli-
gently constructed and unlawfully designed as alleged 
by Plaintiffs, in that case, the alleged defects would have 
been discoverable and therefore remediable at the time of 
completion of the construction and the cause of action 
would have accrued at that time. 
In Poole v. Terminix, 200 F.2d 746 (D.C Cir. 1952), 
Plaintiff had sought damages for breach of an implied 
warranty by the Defendant to do a workmanlike job in 
insulating Plaintiffs house against termites. In that case, 
Plaintiff charged that in the course of the work the De-
fendant drilled holes in the cement floor of Plaintiff's 
basement and then filled these holes with cement. Plain-
tiff alleged that the drilling damaged some tile drain be-
neath the floor, resulting in dampness in the basement, 
but the alleged injury was not discovered until some time 
later when leakage made the dampness visible. Defend-
ant raised the three-year statute of limitations as a defense. 
The suit had been filed more than three years after the 
work was done but within three years from the time when 
the alleged injury was discovered. Plaintiff contended 
that the statute did not begin to run until such discovery 
or by the exercise of ordinary diligence he would have 
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discovered the breach. T h e Court held that for the statute 
of limitations to begin at any time other than when a cause 
of action arose that situation must be limited to one with 
discovery prevented by fraud. T h e Court stated: 
" N o contention is made in the present case 
upon the basis of fraud, either actual or construc-
tive. Accordingly the general rule that limitations 
begin to run from the time of breach, Zellan v. 
Cole, 1950, 87 U.S. App. D . C 9, 183 F.2d 139, 
applies. This conforms with the purpose of stat-
utes of limitation to br ing repose and to bar efforts 
to enforce stale claims as to which evidence might 
be lost or destroyed. See Bailey v. Glover, 1874, 
21 Wal l . 342, 88 U.S. 342, 22 L.Ed. 636. In some 
cases no doubt this rule leads to hardship, but the 
rule for which plaintiff contends often would have 
like consequences. W e must give effect to the 
policy which bars litigation due to contract 
breaches which occurred a longer t ime prior to 
the institution of the litigation than the number of 
years of the applicable statute of l imitations. Even 
in the criminal law, absent specific provision to the 
contrary, a statute of limitations begins to run from 
the time of commission rather than of exposure of 
the alleged offense. See Synnott v. Stale, 1927, 38 
Okl . Cr. 281 , 260 P. 517." 
I t would appear that even if the l imitation imposed 
by this provision does not apply to the Plaintiffs in this 
case, thus br inging the four-year statute into play, the 
terms and definitions with regard to actions of this kind 
for injuries caused by defective design or construction of 
improvement to real property are the statements of in-
tention of the Legislature and would therefore still be 
applicable. Thus , even if Plaintiff wishes to remove him-
self from the seven-year limitation, he cannot change the 
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circumstances under which he brings this action nor re-
move himself from the Legislature's determination of 
when the cause of action would accrue; namely, the com-
pletion of construction as defined in Section 78-12-25.5(2) 
which would be controlling under Section 78-12-1 of the 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Appellants ' actions are barred by Section 78-12-25(2) 
of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
P O I N T III 
SECTION 78-12-25.5 OF T H E U T A H CODE 
A N N O T A T E D IS A VALID A N D CONSTITU-
T I O N A L EXPRESSION OF T H E LEGISLA-
TIVE POLICY DECISION T H A T T H E R E 
SHOULD N O T BE LIABILITY FOR A N IN-
DEFINITE PERIOD IN A CASE OF ALLEGED 
DEFECTIVE C O N S T R U C T I O N . 
Such a determination is within the discretion of the 
Legislature. It has been determined, in the case of this 
statute, that if no cause of action arises within seven years 
of the date of construction then that is prima facie evi-
dence that there was no faulty construction. 
Plaintiff asserts that this statute violates the Constitu-
tion because it may extinguish a cause of action before 
that cause of action arises. 
This is not a violation of due process or equal pro-
tection. The Constitution does not guarantee a right to 
sue but only a right to due process and equal protection. 
This statute does not violate those standards because it 
is not discriminatory. It applies evenly to all injuries 
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which fall within its area of coverage. People who have 
such injuries are not in any suspect classification, and they 
are therefore not deprived of due process or equal pro-
tection. 
Plaintiff relies upon Brown v. Wigbtman, 47 Utah 
31, 151 Pac 366, (1915), to show that 78-12-25.5 is un-
constitutional. Brown does not support Plaintiff's posi-
tion but, rather, recognizes the legislative right to place 
limitations on the right to be heard in court. It specifically 
states that where the statute does not give a remedy the 
Constitution does not require one. 
"The right and power as well as the duty, of 
creating rights and to provide remedies, lies with 
the legislature and not with the courts. The courts 
can only protect existing rights, and they may do 
that only in accordance with established and known 
remedies." 
In many cases our statutes not only extinguish a cause 
of action before the cause of action arises but they also 
completely cut off the cause of action. For example, Work-
man's Compensation cases under Section 35-1-60 cut off 
all civil liability of employers to employees under the 
Workman's Compensation Statutes. See Masich v. United 
States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., et aL, 113 Utah 
101, 191 P.2d 612, (1948), where the Utah Supreme Court 
held that the employee's right to sue was entirely abrogat-
ed by the statutory provisions. 
Defendants urge the Court to take note of the United 
States Supreme Court decision, Morey v. Doted, 354 U.S. 
451, 1 L.Ed. 2d 1485, 77 Sup. Ct. 1344, (1957), where 
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Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, in dissent, caution against 
the invalidation of legislation in the absence of extreme 
circumstances. They state: 
" Inval idat ing legislation is serious business 
and it ought not to be indulged in. . . . In apply-
ing the Equal Protection Clause, we must be fastidi-
ously careful to observe the admonition of Mr. 
Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Stone, and Mr. Justice 
Cardozo that we do not sit as a super legislature. 
Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 80 L.Ed. 299, 317, 
56 S.Ct. 252, 102 ALR 54 (1935)." 
This statute is a valid exercise of legislative discre-
tion wi thin the constitutional limitations upon the legis-
lative powers. It is not unconstitutional. 
The Utah Supreme Court has often held that the 
legislative body has great discretion in fixing limits on 
classification and also that it is not within the judiciary's 
province to question the Legislature's wisdom or motives 
in enactment of a statute. See: Davis v. Ogden City, 117 
Utah 315, 215 P.2d 616, (1950), 16 ALR 2d 1208, re-
hearing denied, 118*Utah 401 , 223 P.2d 412; Slater v. Salt 
Lake City, 115 Utah 476, 206 P.2d 153, (1949); Thomas v. 
Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 197 P.2d 477, 
(1948), appeal denied 69 S. Ct. 739, 336 U.S. 950, 93 L.Ed. 
1090; Rowley v. Public Service Commission, 112 Utah 
116, 185 P.2d 514, (1947); Bateman v. Board of Examin-
ers of State of Utah, 1 Utah 2d 221 , 322 P.2d 381, (1958); 
Broadbent v. Gibson, 105 Utah 53, 140 P.2d 939, (1943); 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56, UCA 1953, 10-3-1; and 
Bradshaw v. Beaver City, 27 Utah 2d 135, 493 P.2d 643, 
(1972). 
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POINT IV 
PLAINTIFFS ARE BARRED FROM BRING-
ING THIS ACTION BECAUSE IN FAILING 
TO ALLEGE A DUTY OWED BY DEFEND-
ANTS TO PLAINTIFFS THEY HAVE FAIL-
ED TO STATE A CLAIM FOR WHICH RE-
LIEF MAY BE GRANTED. 
In the pleadings now before this Court, Plaintiffs 
have not made any allegation of any duty, contractual, 
statutory or otherwise owed by Christensen and Hansen 
to Plaintiffs Good. In the case of Industrial Commission 
of Utah v. Wasatch Grading Co., 14 P.2d 988, 80 Utah 
223, (1932), the Court held that the complaint was in-
sufficient because it failed to disclose the essentials of 
the alleged duty between the parties therein. In the in-
stant case, Plaintiffs have failed to allege a duty owed by 
Defendants to Plaintiffs and therefore they are barred 
from bringing this action. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs are barred from bringing this action against 
Defendants, 
Respectfully submitted, 
Dean E. Conder 
NIELSEN, CONDER, HANSEN 
AND HENRIOD 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondents Don M. Christensen, 
Don M. Christensen Construction 
Co., and Construction Realty 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Guy Burningham 
GUSTIN 8c GUSTIN 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondents Lewis C. Hansen 
and Billie ]. Hansen 
1610 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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